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1 Introduction
In this study, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the effects of
monetary policy on the size of quality increment, economic growth, and social welfare. Distinct
from previous studies relying on the assumption of an exogenous quality step size, this study
extends the innovation-driven growth models and explores an endogenous quality increment
channel through which monetary policy induces noticeable impact on the real variables. To
incorporate money demand into this growth-theoretic framework, we impose various cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraints; that is, a CIA constraint on consumption expenditure as in Lucas
(1980) and Dotsey and Sarte (2000), a CIA constraint on manufacturing as in Arawatari et al.
(2018), and a CIA constraint on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al.
(2015).
In this monetary Schumpeterian growth model, we derive the following results. In the pres-
ence of a CIA constraint exclusively on consumption expenditure, an increase in the nominal
interest rate raises real wage rate through reducing labor supply, which further generates two
counteracting effects on economic growth. First, higher nominal interest rate discourages R&D
incentives since entrepreneurs employing labor to produce inventions now face higher R&D
costs. As a result, the arrival rate of innovation decreases, causing the economic growth rate to
decline. Second, given that the price markup is increasing in the size of quality increment, a ris-
ing wage rate that dampens monopoly profit incentivizes entrepreneurs to pursue more radical
innovations for a higher profit flow, which in turn boosts economic growth. Since the economic
growth rate is jointly determined by the arrival rate of innovation and the size of quality incre-
ment, the overall effect of the nominal interest rate on economic growth depends on the balance
between the above competing forces. By calibrating the model to the US economy, we find that
the relationship between the nominal interest rate and economic growth is more likely to be
monotonically decreasing. Conditional on the Fisher equation which predicts a positive long-run
relationship between nominal interest rate and inflation rate (see Mishkin (1992) and Booth and
Ciner (2001) for supportive empirical evidence), our model also implies a negative correlation
between inflation and economic growth.
When CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing are present, a rise in the nominal
interest rate reinforces the aforementioned positive effect through causing a larger decline in the
monopoly profit and weakens the negative effect through producing an additional reallocation
effect that shifts labor employment from the manufacturing to R&D sector. In this case, the
nexus between the inflation rate and the economic growth rate can be negative or hump-shaped,
depending on the strength of the CIA constraint on manufacturing.1
Furthermore, when consumption expenditure and R&D investment are constrained by cash,
1Vaona (2012) and Barro (2013) find that the relationship between inflation and economic growth is monotonically
decreasing. Nevertheless, a number of empirical studies, such as Khan and Senhadji (2001), Burdekin et al. (2004), and
López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011), have documented an inverted-U shaped relation.
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a higher nominal interest rate weakens the positive effect on the quality step size and strengthens
the negative effect on the innovation arrival rate. This is because a higher nominal interest rate
now causes a larger increase in the R&D cost and therefore a larger decrease in the innovation
arrival rate. In addition, the lowered R&D labor demand in turn mitigates the rise in the wage
rate, which stems from a higher nominal interest rate under the CIA constraint on consumption.
This then depresses the positive impact of the nominal interest rate on the size of quality incre-
ment, as the decline in the monopoly profit becomes smaller in this circumstance. Therefore, the
economic growth rate is monotonically decreasing in the nominal interest rate. Moreover, in all
above cases, the social welfare is always decreasing in nominal interest rate, implying that the
Friedman rule is socially optimal.
This study closely relates to the literature on inflation and innovation. A noticeable repre-
sentative along this line of effort is the pioneering work of Marquis and Reffett (1994), which
explores the effects of inflation on growth in the framework of Romer (1990).2 A great number
of studies have analyzed the effects of inflation in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model, such
as Chu and Lai (2013), Chu and Cozzi (2014), Chu et al. (2015), Chu and Ji (2016), Huang et al.
(2017), Oikawa and Ueda (2018), Zheng et al. (2019), Huang et al. (2019), and Gil and Iglésias
(2020). These models, however, all feature an identical step size of quality improvement. One
novel exception is Chu et al. (2017), who consider the heterogeneity of quality step sizes. How-
ever, they assume that the quality increment is drawn from an exogenously given distribution,
instead of the endogenous choice by entrepreneurs. Accordingly, our study complements their
interesting study and contributes to the literature by allowing the step size of quality increment to
be endogenously chosen by profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. Combined with the conventional
frequency-of-innovation channel, the novel feature of endogenous quality step size provides a
new mechanism in explaining the (potentially) inverted-U relationship between inflation and
economic growth, which helps to reconcile the discrepancies in the empirical literature.
In addition, the proposed model in this study implies a positive relationship between inflation
and price markups, which is consistent with the result in Wu and Zhang (2001) within a growth
framework,3 but might seem inconsistent with the widely recognized implication of standard
New Keynesian models featuring sticky prices. Due to mixed empirical evidence, however, the
positive inflation-markup relationship is not necessarily implausible. Bils (1987), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Martins and Scarpetta (2002), Gali et al. (2007)
provide empirical evidence supportive of countercyclical markups; and Banerjee and Russell
(2001), and Banerjee et al. (2001) identify a negative long-run relationship between inflation and
markup in Australia and most of the G7 countries. In sharp contrast, exploiting the Solow resid-
ual to estimate the cyclical movements in markups, Haskel et al. (1995) explore a panel data set
2Hori (2017) and Arawatari et al. (2018) also consider monetary policy in the Romer variety-expanding model with
heterogeneity in the productivity of R&D entrepreneurs.
3Wu and Zhang (2001) develop a neoclassical growth model with endogenous price markup, which is determined
by firm number and firm size, and predict a positive linkage between inflation and markup.
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of two-digit U.K. manufacturing industries, and find evidence for strongly procyclical markups.
Using both aggregate and detailed manufacturing industry data, Nekarda and Ramey (2013)
suggest that markups are procyclical unconditionally, and either mildly procyclical or acyclical
conditional on demand shocks. Using detailed mirco data on local house prices, retail prices and
households shopping intensity, Stroebel and Vavra (2019) show that rising house prices increase
consumers’ demand by reducing their sensitivity to price changes, and firms raise markups in
response. Their novel evidence suggests a procyclical desired or natural markup, which responds
to monetary policy endogenously.4 In fact, recent empirical evidence has motivated macroeco-
nomic theorists to reinvestigate existing general equilibrium models for a better understanding
of the mechanism under which a positive relationship between inflation and price markups can
be shaped.5 This study exploits the Schumpeterian growth model and provides a discussion on
an alternative possible channel inducing a positive inflation-markup relationship.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 and 4,
respectively, analytically and numerically explore the effects of monetary policy on the quality
increment, economic growth, and social welfare. The final section concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we present the monetary Schumpeterian growth model featuring quality in-
crement that is endogenously chosen by optimizing entrepreneurs. The framework is based
on the classical quality-ladder growth model in Grossman and Helpman (1991). We introduce
money demand via CIA constraints on consumption as in Lucas (1980), on manufacturing as in
Arawatari et al. (2018), and on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014). The nominal interest
rate serves as the monetary policy instrument and the effects of monetary policy are examined
by considering the implications of altering the rate of nominal interest on quality increment,
innovation and economic growth, respectively.
2.1 Household






e−ρt[ln ct + θ ln(1 − Lt)]dt, (1)
where ct is the consumption of final good and Lt is the supply of labor. The parameters ρ > 0
and θ ≥ 0 determine, respectively, the subjective discounting and leisure preference. We assume
4Desired or natural markup is defined as the markup under perfectly flexible prices. See Nekarda and Ramey
(2013) for a detailed survey of the literature on the cyclicality of price markups
5For example, Phaneuf et al. (2018) propose a general equilibrium model with purely forward-looking price setters,
and show that, in the existence of working capital financing, marginal cost can be directly affected by the nominal
interest rate, the mechanism of which is able to induce procyclical movements in price markups.
4
that the size of household Nt does not grow over time and equals N0 at time t = 0, which is
normalized to unity.6
Suppose that the final good is chosen to be the numeraire. Thus, the household’s budget
constraint is given by
ȧt + ṁt = rtat + wtLt − πtmt − ct + τt, (2)
where at is the real value of assets and the return rate of assets is the real interest rate rt. wt is
the real wage rate. mt is the real money balance held by the household and πt is the inflation
rate determining the cost of money holding. The household also receives a lump-sum transfer τt
from the government. We assume that real money balances are required prior to purchasing the
consumption good. The CIA constraint on consumption is ξct ≤ mt, where ξ > 0 measures the
strength of the CIA constraint.
The household maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint and the CIA constraint.
From standard dynamic optimization, we derive the following no-arbitrage condition:
ζt
ηt
− πt = rt, (3)
where ηt and ζt are the Hamiltonian co-state variables on the budget constraint and the CIA
constraint, respectively. As addressed by Bond et al. (1996) and Chang et al. (2019), this no-
arbitrage condition states that the real rate of return on money (i.e., ζt/ηt − πt) must equal to the
real rate of return on asset (i.e., rt). With this no-arbitrage condition, we can derive the familiar
Euler equation such that
ċt
ct
= rt − ρ. (4)
Moreover, we derive the optimality condition for labor supply such that
wt(1 − Lt) = θct(1 + ξit), (5)
where it = rt + πt is the nominal interest rate.
2.2 Production
There is a mass of competitive firms producing a unique final good by aggregating interme-







6By this assumption, we sidestep the issue of scale effects for analytical tractability. Alternatively, Peretto (1998),
Segerstrom (1998), and Howitt (1999a) provide important approaches of removing scale effects in the Schumpeterian
growth model.
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where xt(j) is the quantity of intermediate goods in industry j ∈ [0, 1]. The final-good production
function in (6) yields a unit-elastic demand with respect to each variety such that
xt(j) = yt/pt(j), (7)
where pt(j) denotes the price of xt(j).
There is a unit continuum of industries producing differentiated intermediate goods. Each
industry is temporarily occupied by an industry leader until the arrival of next innovation. We
follow Peretto and Connolly (2007) and Arawatari, Hori and Mino (2018) to assume that a fixed
operating cost is required in production. Accordingly, the production function for the leader in
industry j is
xt(j) = λ
nt(j) [Lx,t(j)− κ] , (8)
where λ > 1 is the quality increment of an innovation, nt(j) is the number of innovations that
have occurred in industry j up to time t, Lx,t(j) is the production labor in industry j, and κ > 0
is the fixed operating cost. We assume that monopolists need to borrow cash to facilitate pro-
duction. Therefore, given λnt(j), the marginal cost of production for the leader in industry j is
mct(j) = wt(1+ αit)/λnt(j), where (1+ αit) represents the additional cost due to a CIA constraint
on manufacturing and α ∈ [0, 1] is the strength of the CIA constraint. Furthermore, we assume
that the previous quality leader in industry j who owns the second-latest production technol-
ogy is able to produce the same product xt(j) at a higher marginal cost of (1 + αit)wt/λnt(j)−1.
Bertrand competition implies that the profit-maximizing price pt(j) is
pt(j) = λmct(j),
which allows the current leader to exclude the competition of previous leader.7 The monopoly
profit in industry j is





yt − κwt(1 + αit), (9)
where we have applied (7) and (8). In addition, the demand function of manufacturing labor is







where the second equality again applies (7). This equation implies that the demand of manufac-
turing labor is identical across industries.
7We assume that the previous leader is inactive when her profit is zero.
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2.3 Innovation
Denote by vt(j, λ) the value of the monopolistic firm in industry j that attempts at creating
an invention with a quality size of λ. Equation (9) implies that the profit flow of each monopolist
across industries j ∈ [0, 1] is identical such that vt(j, λ) = vt(λ) in a symmetric equilibrium.8
Then the no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = Πt + v̇t − µtvt, (11)
where µt is the aggregate intensity of research targeting at a state-of-the-art product and also the
arrival rate of next innovation. Intuitively, the value rtvt is equal to the sum of the profit flow Πt,
the potential capital gain v̇t, and the expected loss µtvt due to creative destruction.
There is a unit continuum of entrepreneurs who employ R&D labor for innovation. Suppose
that an entrepreneur ω ∈ [0, 1] who undertakes at intensity µt(ω) for a time interval of length
dt achieves success with a probability of µt(ω)dt. We assume that the resource cost of research
effort depends on the size of the innovation that the entrepreneur pursues. In particular, research
at intensity µt(ω) requires µt(ω) f (λ) units of labor, where f ′(λ) > 0 and f ′′(λ) > 0. The R&D
cost is thus given by µt(ω) f (λ)wt. The entrepreneur ω chooses λ and µt(ω) at every moment to
maximize her expected profit such that
max
{λ,µt(ω)}
µt(ω)vt(λ)dt − µt(ω) f (λ)wtdt.
The optimal choice of quality increment satisfies the following first-order condition:
v′t(λ) = f
′(λ)wt. (12)
which equates the marginal benefit of a larger innovation to the marginal cost of achieving it.
The maximization of net benefits from R&D with respect to the choice of research intensity yields
the zero-expected-profit condition such that
vt(λ) = f (λ)wt. (13)
Moreover, in equilibrium, the unit measure of entrepreneurs implies that the aggregate research




8See, for example, Cozzi, Giordani and Zamparelli (2007) for a theoretical justification for the symmetric equilib-
rium in this strand of Schumpeterian growth model.
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2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary sector is formulated as in Arawatari et al. (2018). The monetary authority
controls the nominal interest rate i, which is kept constant over time such that it = i > 0 for all
time t > 0. The seigniorage revenue is rebated to households via lump-sum transfers. Denote
by Mt the nominal money supply at time t. Thus, the budget constraint is given by τt = Ṁt/Pt,
where Pt is the nominal price of the final good.
2.5 General equilibrium
Definition 1. The general equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices {Pt, wt, rt, it, pt(j), vt}∞t=0 and
allocations {ct, at, mt, yt, Lt, Lx,t, Lr,t}∞t=0 such that the representative household maximizes utility taking
{rt, wt} as given; competitive final-good firms produce {yt} to maximize profits taking {pt(j)} as given;
each differentiated intermediate-good producer j produces xt(j) and chooses {Lx,t(j), pt(j)} to maximize
profits taking {wt} as given; entrepreneurs choose {µt, λ} to maximize expected profits taking {wt} as
given; and all markets clear. That is, the final-good and asset markets clear such that ct = yt and at = vt,
respectively, where vt is the aggregate firm value. The labor-market-clearing condition is
Lx,t + Lr,t = Lt, (14)
where Lx,t ≡
∫ 1
0 Lx,t(j)dj and Lr,t =
∫ 1
0 µt(ω) f (λ)dω = µt f (λ) are the aggregate demand of manufac-
turing labor and R&D labor, respectively.
Then we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. Holding constant the nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps to a unique and
stable balanced growth path along which each variable grows at constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
On the steady state, the firm value vt grows at the rate of consumption and final good, and
labor allocations are stationary. By applying the Euler equation (4) and the no-arbitrage condition





Now v′t(λ) can be calculated by using (15). Substituting v
′
t(λ) and (15) into the two first-order












≡ ǫ ⇔ λ =
1 + 1/ǫ
1 − κwt(1 + αi)/yt
, (16)
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where ǫ is defined as the elasticity of the resource requirement with respect to the size of the
attempted innovation. Notice that each entrepreneur takes the aggregate research intensity µ as
given.




(ρ + µ) f (λ) + κ(1 + αi)
(λ − 1)/λ
. (17)
Substituting (17) into (10), together with the fact that Lx,t = Lx,t(j), yields the aggregate demand
of manufacturing labor such that
Lx = κ +
(ρ + µ) f (λ) + κ(1 + αi)
(λ − 1)(1 + αi)
. (18)
Moreover, using (5) and (17), we can rewrite the aggregate labor supply as
L = 1 − θ(1 + ξi)
ct
wt
= 1 − θ(1 + ξi)
(ρ + µ) f (λ) + κ(1 + αi)
(λ − 1)/λ
, (19)
where the final-good resource condition has been applied. Next, substituting (18) and (19) into
the labor-market-clearing condition (14) yields the following equation:
κ + µ f (λ) +
f (λ)(ρ + µ) + κ(1 + αi)
(λ − 1)(1 + αi)
+ θ(1 + ξi)












[1 + θλ(1 + ξi)(1 + αi)]
1 + (λ − 1)(1 + αi) + λθ(1 + ξi)(1 + αi)
,
(20)
which contains two endogenous variables {λ, µ}. The other equation for solving the model is
obtained by inserting (17) into (16) such that
λ −
κ(1 + αi)(λ − 1)
f (λ)(ρ + µ) + κ(1 + αi)
= 1 + 1/ǫ ⇔ µ =
κ(1 + αi)/ǫ
(λ − 1 − 1/ǫ) f (λ)
− ρ. (21)
Given the equilibrium innovation arrival rate and size of quality increment, we derive the growth
rate of output by substituting (8) into (6) to rewrite the production function of final good such
that
yt = QtLx. (22)














where the second equality applies the law of large number. Accordingly, the steady-state growth
9







= µ∗ ln λ∗. (23)
Before closing this section, we show that our analysis on how the nominal interest rate relates
to quality increment, economic growth, and social welfare, also applies to the counterpart on
how inflation relates to those variables, as justified in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2017).
To see this, we combine the Fisher equation and the Euler equation to show that the inflation rate
is given by π = i − r = i − g(i)− ρ. As long as ∂g(i)/∂i < 1, we have ∂π/∂i = 1 − ∂g(i)/∂i > 0.9
This positive long-run relationship between the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate is also
supported by the empirical evidence in Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001).
3 Implications of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on the optimal size of quality incre-
ment, innovation, economic growth, and social welfare. In Subsection 3.1, we consider a special
case in which the CIA constraint is only on consumption. In Subsection 3.2, we consider the
general case of both CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing. In the next section
(i.e., Section 4), we numerically evaluate the impacts of monetary policy on the aforementioned
variables along with social welfare.
3.1 Monetary effects under CIA constraint on consumption
To better understand how monetary policy affects the real aspect, we first consider the special
case where CIA constraint is exclusively on consumption. When the manufacturing activities are











[1 + θλ(1 + ξi)]





(λ − 1 − 1/ǫ) f (λ)
− ρ, (25)
respectively. Equation (24) features a positive slope and a positive λ−intercept in the {λ, µ} space
as shown in Figure 1; (20) is denoted as the “labor condition". In addition, equation (25) also
contains two endogenous variables {µ, λ} but features a negative slope, with no intercepts, in
the {λ, µ} space as shown in Figure 1; (21) is denoted as the “R&D condition”. The intersection
9Under our calibrated parameter values, steady-state inflation is increasing in the nominal interest rate.
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at point O in Figure 1 determines the unique steady-state values for µ and λ.10
Figure 1 shows that an increase in the nominal interest rate shifts down the “labor condi-
tion" curve and leaves the “R&D condition" curve unaffected, leading to a lower innovation rate
accompanied by a larger size of quality increment. Intuitively, due to the CIA constraint on
consumption, (5) shows that a higher nominal interest rate raises the opportunity cost of con-
sumption, causing households to substitute for leisure. As a consequence, the decline in labor
supply drives up the real wage rate, inducing two opposing effects on economic growth. On the
one hand, the rise in the wage rate decreases the monopoly profit flow for a given size of quality
increment, as shown in (9). This in turn induces entrepreneurs to pursue a more radical innova-
tion with a higher innovating firm value. On the other hand, the rise in the wage rate increases
the R&D cost, which discourages the R&D incentive and thus reduces the innovation rate. More-
over, an attempt of a more radical innovation is associated with more R&D labor demand and
a larger R&D cost, which reinforces the negative impact of a rise in the nominal interest rate on
the innovation arrival rate. The above results are summarized in the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under the endogenous quality step size λ∗, a higher nominal interest rate decreases the
arrival rate of innovation but increases the size of quality increment.









Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium under a CIA constraint on consumption.

















In an economy in which the quality increment is exogenously given, the channel of changing the
size of quality increment through which monetary policy affects economic growth is shut down,
10See Appendix A.2 for the details for which the intersection between the labor condition (20) and the R&D condition
(21) is unique.
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i.e., ∂λ∗/∂i = 0. In this case, the economic growth rate g is a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate i, as in the existing studies such as Chu and Cozzi (2014). Nevertheless, in the
economy in which the quality increment can be endogenously determined by the entrepreneurs,
a change in the nominal interest rate can affect the economic growth rate through the size of
quality increment in addition to the frequency of innovation. This is the novel mechanism in
our model that could cause a non-monotonic effect of the nominal interest rate on the economic
growth rate.
3.2 Monetary effects under CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing
We now proceed to the general case with CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing.
Figure 2 describes the effects of a higher nominal interest rate on the quality step size and the
innovation arrival rate. Comparing (20) and (21) to (24) and (25), it is obvious that the presence
of an additional CIA constraint on manufacturing causes the “R&D condition" to rise, but leads










Figure 2: The steady-state equilibrium under CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing.
In this case, the overall impact of an increase in the nominal interest rate on the quality incre-
ment and innovation becomes ambiguous. The intuition for this result is as follows. On the one
hand, with higher nominal interest rate, imposing a CIA constraint on manufacturing further re-
duces monopoly profit, which reinforces the negative effect from rising real wage rate. Both these
effects motivate entrepreneurs to pursue an even more radical innovation aiming to set a larger
price markup and gain a higher profit flow. On the other hand, a CIA constraint on manufac-
turing creates incentives for labor reallocation from the manufacturing sector to the R&D sector,
which mitigates the negative effect of inflation on R&D originating from the consumption-leisure
decision channel. Whether a higher nominal interest rate increases or decreases the quality in-
crement and innovation depends on the relative magnitude of the above effects. Given this
ambiguity, we provide a discussion in the numerical analysis that follows.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this subsection, we calibrate the model to the US data and numerically evaluate the ef-
fects of nominal interest rate (and inflation rate) on quality increment, innovation, economic
growth and social welfare, respectively. To facilitate the analysis, we assume the functional form
f (λ) = βλ5 as the benchmark and consider alternative functions in the sensitivity analysis.11
To perform this quantitative analysis, we assign steady-state values to the structural parameters
{ρ, ξ, α, θ, κ, β}. The discount rate ρ is set to a conventional value of 0.02. As for the strength
of the CIA constraint on consumption (i.e., ξ), we follow Zheng et al. (2019) to set it to 0.17, for
matching the ratio of M1-consumption in the US. As for the strength of the CIA constraint on
manufacturing, we follow Arawatari et al. (2018) to set α = 1 as the benchmark. To pin down
the value of remaining parameters, we match the following long-run empirical moments. (a) The
conventional value of the economic growth rate is 2%; (b) The long-run average inflation rate in
the US is about π = 2.5%. Thus, the nominal interest rate in the steady state is determined by
the Fisher equation such that i = r + π = ρ + g + π = 6.5%; (c) The standard time of employ-
ment to 1/3; (d) The arrival rate of innovation µ∗ is set to 8% as the benchmark value.12 Table 1
summarizes these moments and calibrated parameter values.
Table 1: Parameter values and targeted moments
Targeted moments Parameters
Innovation arrival rate 8% ρ 0.02
M1-consumption ratio 0.17 ξ 0.17
Economic growth rate 2% α 1
Time of employment 1/3 κ 0.0223
Average inflation rate 2.5% θ 1.8146
β 0.1622
4.1 Results
Given the benchmark estimated parameters, we now quantify the impacts of the nominal
interest rate (and the inflation rate) on the quality increment, the innovation rate, the economic
growth rate, and the social welfare, respectively. Figure 3a and 3b display that the size of quality
11We consider f (λ) = βλ5 for the following reason. Assuming f (λ) = βλ5 means the elasticity is ǫ = 5. According
to (21), λ > 1 + 1/ǫ = 1.2 must hold. As shown below, given the conventional economic growth rate and arrival rate
of innovation, the benchmark quality step size, namely the price markup, is 1.284. In general, the market value of
price markup is lower than 1.4 (see, for example, Jones and Williams (2000)). Therefore, to correspond to the empirical
evidence, we take f (λ) = βλ5 as the benchmark. We also consider a sensitivity analysis on the function form of f (λ)
in Subsection 4.2.
12The existing literature has considered different values. For example, using a structural model to estimate, Ca-
ballero and Jaffe (2002) report an innovation arrival rate of 4%. Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) find the roughly same
value (i.e., 3.5%), whereas Lanjouw (1998) shows that the probability of obsolescence is in the range of 7%-12%. We
thus select an intermediate value in this exercise.
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increment is increasing in the inflation rate, but the arrival rate of innovation is decreasing in
it. When raising the inflation rate from −0.0400 (i.e., i = 0) to 0.1601 (i.e., i = 0.2), the quality
step size rises from 1.2795 to 1.2937, whereas the arrival rate of innovation declines from 0.0810 to
0.0773. As a result, the growth rate of output becomes an inverted-U function of the inflation rate.
Figure 4a shows that the growth-maximizing inflation rate is around 3.87%, which is consistent
with the estimates in a number of empirical evidence such as Burdekin et al. (2004) and Kremer
et al. (2013). This result indicates that the positive effect of inflation on the quality increment
dominates the negative effect of inflation on the innovation arrival rate when the inflation rate is
in a low level, and the positive effect is dominated by the negative one when the inflation rate
becomes sufficiently high.
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Figure 3: (a) Inflation and size of quality increment; (b) Inflation and arrival rate of innovation.
To explore the welfare effect of inflation, we derive the steady-state welfare function. This is


















where Q0 is normalized to unity, and Lx and g = µ ln λ are given by in (18) and (23), respectively.
Figure 4b shows that the social welfare level is decreasing in the inflation rate. For example,
raising the inflation rate from −0.0400 to 0.1601 causes the social welfare U to decline from
−9.7924 to −17.8742. This result implies that the optimality of the Friedman rule holds in this
case.
4.2 Robustness analysis
In this subsection, we conduct two experiments: one is to reduce the strength of the CIA con-
straint on manufacturing to zero, and the other is to examine the extent to which the quantitative
results would change under an alternative function of f (λ) = βλ3.
We first consider the case of the CIA constraint only on consumption (i.e., α = 0). By keeping
14
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Figure 4: (a) Inflation and economic growth; (b) Inflation and social welfare.
other parameter values unchanged as in the benchmark, we evaluate the impacts of inflation on
the interested variables. Figure 5a, 5b and 6b show that, similar to the previous benchmark case,
the size of quality step is increasing in the inflation rate and the innovation arrival rate is decreas-
ing in it; these results are consistent with the implications of Proposition 1. However, the growth
rate of output is now a monotonically decreasing function of the inflation rate as described in
Figure 6a. Recalling the analysis in Subsection 3.2, when the CIA constraint on manufactur-
ing is present, the growth-promoting effect of higher inflation is two-fold as follows: (a) higher
inflation reduces the monopoly profit, which tends to induce entrepreneurs to pursue a more
radical innovation; (b) this more radical innovation reallocates labor from the intermediate-good
sector to the R&D sector, which tends to raise the innovation arrival rate. When the CIA con-
straint on manufacturing is absent, these two layers of the positive growth force are significantly
weakened, leading to a monotonically decreasing effect of inflation on economic growth in the
dominant position.
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Figure 5: (a) Inflation and size of quality increment (α = 0); (b) Inflation and arrival rate of innovation
(α = 0).
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Figure 6: (a) Inflation and economic growth (α = 0); (b) Inflation and social welfare (α = 0).
Next, we examine the robustness of quantitative results under f = λ3, while keeping other
parameter values unchanged as in the benchmark. The results regarding the impacts of inflation
on the size of quality increment, the arrival rate of innovation, the economic growth rate and the
social welfare are reported in Figure 7a, 7b, 8a and 8b, respectively. It is shown that our model
results are robust to this functional change. For example, raising the inflation rate still increases
the quality step size and decreases the innovation arrival rate and welfare level. Moreover, despite
of a larger threshold value of inflation rate (i.e., 10.3%), the growth rate of output continues to be
a hump-shaped function of the inflation rate.
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Figure 7: (a) Inflation and size of quality increment ( f (λ) = λ3); (b) Inflation and arrival rate of innovation
( f (λ) = λ3).
4.3 An extension of a CIA constraint on R&D
When entrepreneurs’ R&D activities are constrained by cash, they make borrowing from
households to facilitate the wage payment for R&D labor and make returns based on the nominal
interest rate i. In this case, the R&D cost for a typical firm ω ∈ [0, 1] is given by µt(ω) f (λ)wt(1 +
16
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Figure 8: (a) Inflation and economic growth ( f (λ) = λ3); (b) Inflation and social welfare ( f (λ) = λ3).
ηi), where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 represents the degree of the CIA constraint on R&D. Accordingly, the two
first-order conditions in (12) and (13) now are given by
v′t(λ) = f
′(λ)wt(1 + ηi), (27)
vt(λ) = f (λ)wt(1 + ηi). (28)
After some manipulations, we can derive the output to wage ratio, the aggregate demand for




(ρ + µ) f (λ)(1 + ηi) + κ
(λ − 1)/λ
, (29)
Lx = κ +
(ρ + µ)(1 + ηi) f (λ) + κ
(λ − 1)
, (30)
L = 1 − θ(1 + ξi)
(ρ + µ)(1 + ηi) f (λ) + κ
(λ − 1)/λ
. (31)








+ ρ(1 + ηi)
]
[1 + θλ(1 + ξi)]




(λ − 1 − 1/ǫ) f (λ)(1 + ηi)
− ρ. (33)
As shown in Figure 9, a higher nominal interest rate shifts down both the “Labor condition"
and “R&D condition" curves. Therefore, the innovation arrival rate is lowered unambiguously.
13To focus on how the incorporation of CIA constraint on R&D affects the model results, we do not consider the
CIA constraint on manufacturing in this extension for simplicity.
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Figure 9: The steady-state equilibrium under CIA constraints on consumption and R&D.
Similar to the previous exercises, we resort to a quantitative analysis to evaluates the effect of
inflation on the quality step size, the innovation arrival rate, economic growth, and social welfare,
respectively, in this extension. We recalibrate this extended model to pin down the value of the
parameter η. In addition to the moments used in the benchmark, we use the R&D labor share in
the US for calibration. Specifically, we use the ratio of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
over the manufacturing labor force, which is around 4.2%.14 The calibrated parameter values are
reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values and targeted moments
ρ ξ κ θ β η
0.02 0.17 0.0226 1.9108 0.1504 0.4526
Given the above recalibrated parameters, we quantify the effects of inflation on the aggregate
variables. In the presence of CIA constraints on both consumption expenditure and innovative
activities, Figure 10a shows that the size of quality increment is still increasing in inflation. In
addition, the innovation arrival rate remains as a decreasing function of inflation, as described
in Figure 10b. Intuitively, when the CIA constraint on R&D is present, a higher nominal interest
rate (and the inflation rate) generates an additional negative impact on the innovation arrival rate,
since the increase in the R&D cost discourages R&D incentives. Moreover, the lowered R&D labor
demand mitigates the rise in the real wage rate and weakens the impact of the nominal interest
rate on the monopoly profit, which in turn lessens the positive growth effect due to a large quality
increment. Therefore, a higher inflation rate continues to result in a lower economic growth rate,
as in the benchmark case. Figure 11a shows that raising the nominal interest rate from 0 to 20
14The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D is obtained from Science and Engineering Indicators
2000 (Appendix Tables 3-25) published by the National Science Foundation. The data on manufacturing employees
are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
18
percentage point causes a decline in the economic growth rate by 8.521% (percentage), and this
magnitude is larger than the one in the benchmark case (i.e., 3.246%). As for the welfare effect of
inflation, Figure 11b indicates that the Friedman rule still can lead to a socially optimal outcome.
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Figure 10: (a) Inflation and size of quality increment (η = 0.4526); (b) Inflation and arrival rate of
innovation (η = 0.4526).
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Figure 11: (a) Inflation and economic growth (η = 0.4526); (b) Inflation and social welfare (η = 0.4526).
5 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on quality increment, innovation,
economic growth and social welfare, respectively. In the model with only a CIA constraint on
consumption, we find that a higher nominal interest rate induces R&D firms to pursue a larger
quality step size, which would stimulate economic growth. Nevertheless, a higher nominal
interest rate raises the R&D cost and tends to depress innovation and economic growth. The
CIA constraint on manufacturing reinforces the positive growth effect and weakens the negative
effect. In contrast, the CIA constraint on R&D strengths exclusively the positive growth effect.
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By calibrating our model to the US economy, we find that the economic growth rate can be either
a monotonically decreasing or hump-shaped function of the inflation rate, whereas the social
welfare is always decreasing in inflation.
This study can be extended in two directions. First, by normalizing the population size
to unity, this study sterilizes the strong scale-effect problem present in the first-generation en-
dogenous growth model such as in Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion
and Howitt (1992). Alternatively, one may remove the scale effects in the Schumpeterian growth
model by considering the semi-endogenous-growth approach as in Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom
(1998) or the second-generation approach as in Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999b). Second, mon-
etary policy in this study is introduced by imposing CIA constraints in different sectors. One
may revisit how the impacts of inflation on nominal macroeconomic variables would change in
a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous quality increment if other formulations that
incorporate monetary policy, such as money-in-utility function in Chu and Lai (2013) and price
rigidity (via menu costs) in Oikawa and Ueda (2018), are considered. Due to its complexity, we
leave these potentially interesting extensions to future research.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that a time path of [it]∞t=0 is stationary such that it = i for all t. Define a transformed

















= rt − ρ. (A.2)
From (11), the law of motion for vt is
v̇t
vt




















where vt = f (λ)wt in (13) has been applied. To derive a relationship between Lr,t and Φt, we
first use (18) and (13) to derive







In addition, substituting ct = yt and (13) into (5) yields
Lt = 1 − θ(1 + ξi)
ct
wt
= 1 − θ(1 + ξi)Φt f (λ). (A.6)
Then, substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into the labor-market-clearing condition yields
Lr,t = Lt − Lx,t = 1 − κ − f (λ)Φt
[





Substituting (A.7) into (A.4) yields an autonomous dynamical equation of Φt such that
Φ̇t
Φt







Given that λ is stationary over time and Φt is a control variable, the coefficient associated with
Φt being positive implies that the dynamics of Φt is characterized by saddle-point stability such
that Φt jumps immediately to its steady-state value given by
Φ =
1/ f (λ) + ρ
1 + θ(1 + ξi)
. (A.9)
Equations (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7) imply that if Φ is stationary, then Lx, Lr, and L must all be
stationary as well.
A.2 Uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium















(1 − κ) [λ − (λ − 1)(1 + ǫ)]
f (λ)
+ ρ −
κθλ(1 + ξi)− κ[1 + θλ(1 + ξi)](1 + ǫ)
f (λ)
≷ 0
⇔(1 − κ) [λ − (λ − 1)(1 + ǫ)] + ρ f (λ) + κ[1 + ǫ + θλǫ(1 + ξi)] ≷ 0
⇔(1 − κ)(1 + ǫ − λǫ) + ρ f (λ) + κ[1 + ǫ + θλǫ(1 + ξi)] ≷ 0
⇔1 + ǫ + ρ f (λ) + λǫ[κ − 1 + κθ(1 + ξi)] ≷ 0.
(A.10)
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Apparently, the left-hand side of the last inequality is an increasing function of κ. As κ → 1,
the last inequality is reduced to 1 + ǫ + ρ f (λ) + λǫθ(1 + ξi) > 0. As κ → 0, the last inequality
is reduced to 1 + ǫ + ρ f (λ) − λǫ > 0 if λ < 2, which holds since the value of λ in empirical
studies is generally smaller than 2. Therefore, we obtain ∂µ/∂λ > 0. This implies that µ is a
monotonically increasing function of λ and features a positive slope and a positive λ-intercept
in the {µ, λ} space as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that (21)
implies that µ is a monotonically decreasing function of λ and features a negative slope, with no
intercepts,15 in the {µ, λ} space in Figure 1. Therefore, there must exist a unique equilibrium in
which λ and µ are solely determined.
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